Law for Sale -- Revised Proposal

Pramudya Octavinanda has very interesting ideas on how to design anti-corruption policy in response to my earlier posting here. Let me start with his points that I agree with.

First, the main objective of penal sanction system should be to recover the state's assets corruptors stole as much as possible. Second, it also has to prevent corruptors to buy (il)legal protection and political position that allows them to steal in the first place and afterward. In other words, it should make bad guys miserably poor.

Yet, what I don't really agree with is the idea to link two or more anti-corruption agencies for the sake of efficiency. If you let this happen, what we would likely have is an anti-corruption monopolist. This monopolist can sell their services either to corruptor or to the state whichever pays higher price. So if you want them to work in favor of the state and arrest the corruptor, the state has to pay or provide incentive more than what corruptor can do. This is expensive.

So I think I'd still opt for competition amongst anti-corruption agencies.

Now let's discuss Pram's objection on this competition. He said that without (formal) case transferability, competition won't work. But this is actually the very basic premise of my proposal for more competition -- that is to increase transferability. In my idea of transferability, bad guys can not rely on one agency to get protected, because other agencies can still arrest them legally. Competition would remove privilege of one agency over another; and with this, a case can be "transferred" to any agency willing to arrest the bad guy.

As for incentive for these competing agencies, as also asked by Mova in his comment, I'm thinking to incorporate Pram's insight on making corruptors poor and maximizing state's stolen assets recovery in incentive structure as follows.

Let's make the state (say President, or the Ministry of Finance) determine how much money they want to see back to state's coffer. If there is 100 bn IDR state's loss in a corruption case, they can set, say, 90 bn IDR recovery target and announce this to the competing anti-corruption agencies. Any agency taking this offer has to provide 90 bn IDR to the state but can take the remaining receipt, i.e 5 bn IDR if the agency can make the bad guy repay 95 bn IDR to the state.

So the state doesn't need to add more resources (higher salaries, bonus, etc) to anti-corruption agency, but any residual outcome belongs to the winning agency.

Do you think it will work?

Law for Sale -- or Corruptor's Revealed Preference

I think it is good to have competition amongst anti-corruption squads or law enforcers. Think this way: a corruptor can bribe the police, but, in competition, the general attorney office or KPK will still be more than willing to arrest him/her - and vice versa.

Now you may want to say: what if the corruptor bribe them all? It's possible, but at least it is now more expensive to do so than with single anti-corruption office. The competition raises the corruptor's cost of wrongdoing and make anti-corruption more efficient.

Better yet if we can somehow set an competitive auction mechanism in which police, general attorney office, and KPK can bid to arrest a corruptor and force this corruptor repay the certain amount of the state's loss, and the office proposing lowest operational budget would win.

Who's afraid of such competition (a.k.a the loser)? First, the one from less efficient office. Second, and the foremost, the operation target, that is the corruptor him/herself. The non-corruptor would have no objection about this.

Now, if you know someone fiercely takes troubles and makes a lot of fuss on this competition among anti-corruption agencies, you may ask yourself and be suspicious if he/she is either from the less efficient agency or Mr/Ms Corruptor him/herself.

We economist call it his/her revealed preference -- regardless her/his stated preference as self-proclaimed anti-corruption bravados.

Gary Becker's World View -or Something Like That

One feature I like from Chicago political-economy school is their optimistic view on market-like competition and the ability of people to generate it --regardless of any (usually government) attempt to suppress such competition.

Gary Becker interview here is one example. Unlike the right-wing radicals who saw the passing of healthcare bill as a doomsday for America, Becker remains rather optimistic that voters as well as competing interest groups generally would place more realistic assessment and control on this political and politicians' product.

I share his view on the role of interest groups competition - including on the latest Pansus brouhaha.

My favorite lines, however, is his explanation on people's anti-market bias. Becker says at ease:

"There's one bias that we're up against all the time: Markets are hard to appreciate. People tend to impute good motives to government. And if you assume that government officials are well meaning, then you also tend to assume that government officials always act on behalf of the greater good. People understand that entrepreneurs and investors by contrast just try to make money, not act on behalf of the greater good. And they have trouble seeing how this pursuit of profits can lift the general standard of living. The idea is too counterintuitive. So we're always up against a kind of in-built suspicion of markets. There's always a temptation to believe that markets succeed by looting the unfortunate."

Yes, indeed market is hard to appreciate - mostly based on appeal to emotion.

What To Do Against Big Boys

OK, I haven't had time to have coffee at the legendary murkycoffee at Clarendon and now they had closed the cafe down and moved to near Chinatown. But this op-ed by its former owner Nick Cho, is worth to ponder.

But if Starbucks brings one of these new concepts to Washington, I'll be among the first in line. To me, Starbucks is only a problem if the quality of their coffee gets worse, and this new spinoff might help it get better. (If they want to compete with the likes of Victrola and other great third-wave coffee bars, it's going to have to get a lot better.)

I hope the coffee wars help nudge the caliber of all coffee upward. Just because you're not a corporate behemoth doesn't mean you serve delicious brew. The dirty little secret of most independent coffee shops is that they don't know how or don't care to serve high-quality coffee. They believe that furnishing their shops with comfy chairs and knowing the names of their customers' dogs is all that matters.

Bottom line: competition is good. And if you have the right taste of (real) espresso, burger as good as Ray's Hell Burger, or rigorous research methodology; you shouldn't worry about Starbucks, McD, or any "imperialist" field of science.

Ain't Stupid Voters

So you think voters are stupid, so that you can just buy their votes?

Think again.